

Disseminated by Mercury Public Affairs, LLC, a registered foreign agent, on behalf of Nnamdi Kanu - Leader of the Indigenous People of Biafra. More information is on file with the Dept. Of Justice, Washington, DC.

https://www.independent.co.uk/news/long_reads/nnamdi-kanu-indigenous-people-of-biafra-conflict-1967-a9169196.html

‘Soldiers came to kill me: I’d be shot in the head and dumped in a shallow grave with my dead companions’

At the height of the war in 1969, 12,000 people a day starved to death in Biafra. More than 50 years later and the violent persecution of the Biafran people by the Nigerian state continues unabated. **Nnamdi Kanu** on the battle for self-determination



- Wednesday 6 November 2019 14:15
- [20 comments](#)



The Biafra war was fought to counter the secession of Biafra from Nigeria (AFP)

I

t was 14 September 2017. I woke up with a start. It was about

4pm. I was still recuperating, and I was sleeping that afternoon in my room, and someone was shaking me and calling my name. I blinked. I might have started involuntarily. I was in my old home in Umuahia. My parents and other members of my family were there, brothers, nephews, nieces, cousins. We had friends and supporters outside and inside. I had felt safe, secure.

Then I heard the gunfire and I understood what the man standing over me was trying to tell me. I had to get up. I had to get out now. Soldiers had

come. They were attacking the compound, shooting, killing my friends and family.

But I refused to go. I suppose for a minute or so I refused to believe what they were telling me: that the soldiers had come to kill me; I would be shot in the head, dumped among my dead companions in a shallow grave on the side of some road. They would say I had resisted arrest. That we had opened fire on the soldiers. That we were to blame. But we had no guns in the house. We only had our voices. And my men had been telling the soldiers they had no right to enter.

My name is Nnamdi Kanu. I am the leader of the Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB). All my life my colleagues and I have been working for Biafran self-determination, the right for the people of Biafra to choose their own destiny, to be free from persecution. You may remember the Biafran war, 50 years ago. In May 1967 Biafra was left with no choice but to secede from Nigeria only to face a vastly superior invasion army and a blockade of food supplies supported by governments as diverse as the UK and the Soviet Union.



Shame of a nation: up to 12,000 people a day died from starvation during the civil war (Getty)

You may remember those photographs of starving children, their bellies distended, crying with hunger, crying without tears because their tear ducts had dried up. Dying mothers, Biafran youth dead on the roads around Port Harcourt. How many Biafrans were killed because of this deliberate policy of starvation has been argued ever since. But it is in the millions. We believe five million. Other estimates are anything between one and eight million. But a handful of adults and children would have been too many, never mind millions.

It was a terrible and inglorious beginning to post-colonial African history. But that was 50 years ago. Now, today in 2019 the violent, brutal persecution of the Biafran people by the Nigerian state and their supporters continues unabated. I will give you facts and figures. I will tell you about the murders, the beatings, farmers driven from their land, young men unarmed except with the flag of our country, shot dead in the streets by those ostensibly sent to 'protect' us. I will tell you all these things.



Nnamdi Kanu (AFP/Getty)

But first... My men began to drag me from the bedroom. I protested. I didn't want to leave my home. I wanted to confront the soldiers and ask them what they had come for. In just less than a month I had a court hearing. I was determined to be there. My story would be told. The world would know how the Nigerian Security Forces tried to keep me imprisoned without trial on trumped-up charges. How they refused to bring me to court when a judge demanded it. How they ignored the bail that had been posted. How there was still some faint ghost of independence among Nigeria's judiciary. I would stay for that.

I was being bundled down the stairs and out into the compound at the back, away from the soldiers who had forced their way into the front of the house. My men pushed and pulled me towards the high perimeter wall

Overhead I could hear helicopter gunships, their propellers whirring with that sick, lazy beat they have when they hover. More gunfire. Shouting. Soldiers shouting. My men shouting. I realised the soldiers were not here to arrest me – they could have done that at any time. These were crack troops; they'd called in the air force. They were not here to negotiate my surrender.

I was being bundled down the stairs and out into the compound at the back, away from the soldiers who had forced their way into the front of the house. My men pushed and pulled me towards the high perimeter wall which ran the full circumference of the compound. Ten feet high. Somehow, they man-handled me to the top of this and I fell to the ground the other side.

A sharp, sharp pain literally took my breath away. My limbs flailed. My mouth opened but I couldn't take in air. I had fallen on my left rib cage. I gasped, convinced that I had punctured my lung in the fall. I heard footsteps and people talking, more gunfire. And always the sound of helicopter blades ripping up the air above me. Then I blanked out.

More than 28 of my fellow IPOB members were killed that day. They had tried to defend my home, my family, without guns, without clubs, only with their bodies and their words. The soldiers even shot and killed the family dog. Initially the Nigerian army denied the assault, but footage and photographs show the attack as it happened and its aftermath.

I wish this had been an unusual day in Biafraland. Violence, harassment and persecution by the Nigerian state and their unofficial militia are constant

these days. Biafrans have been persecuted and murdered since before I was born: from the killings of hundreds of Igbo people in Jos in 1945 to the attempted extermination of Biafrans during the war of 1967-70 and modern-day pogroms such as the on-going military attacks on Biafra by the Nigerian Army known as “Operation Python Dance”. Then there is the systematic cleansing of whole areas by Fulani herdsmen from the north. Biafrans have been butchered for reasons that range from religious intolerance, economic incompetence and xenophobic warmongering on the part of a Nigerian state that can hardly keep itself together.

The case of the so-called Muslim Fulani herdsmen from the north of Nigeria, who have already been recognised as terrorists by the international community, is a perfect example of this ongoing persecution. Government policies intended to [take land from Biafra and give it to Fulani](#) from the north are driven by a strong undertone of radical political Islam, their objective literally to change the landscape by creating a homeland for the Fulani in the south in order to dominate Nigeria’s political space indefinitely. The People of Biafra and the south of Nigeria are predominantly Christian and Jewish. The Fulani and other people of the north are Muslim. I don’t wish to stoke religious tensions – I am a man of faith and I respect the faith of others – but driving out Christian farmers to settle Muslim herdsmen on their land is not only economic insanity, it is ethnic cleansing.

According to the [most recent Global Index on Terror](#), the first and fourth most deadly Islamic Terrorist organisations in the world operate in Nigeria. Boko Haram is first while the Fulani Herdsmen represent the fourth. More than 1,700 deaths were attributed to the Fulani in the first nine months of 2018. Little is done to stem the flow of violence from either group. The Nigerian army avoids confrontation with Boko Haram and the Fulani enjoy the tacit support of the Nigerian government. Meanwhile, the army is busy attacking peaceful Biafrans under the smoke screen of ‘military manoeuvres’.

What astonishes me, though, is the almost total silence from the world's media, politicians and the international community surrounding this horrible persecution. The use of Fulani herdsmen to drive farmers from their land, with hundreds of men and women killed in peaceful farming communities in Plateau State and Adamawa and Enugu, documented by the Global Index on Terror and [confirmed by Human Rights Watch](#), ought to be worthy enough of reporting. But we must add the killing and brutal beating by the Nigerian army and police of anyone who supports the Indigenous People of Biafra or calls for Biafran self-determination.



IPOB supporters and members of the Yahveh Yashua Synagogue celebrate Shabbat (AFP/Getty)

In 2017 [Amnesty International recorded hundreds](#) of killings of Biafrans by the Nigerian state. These killings cannot be disputed. The numbers since have not been collated but will be equal. Bodies are buried in shallow graves, thrown in the bush or left on the street. Since 2017 state oppression has included: the beating of young men attending a relative's funeral in [Onitcha in 2019](#); in August 2018 the arrest and imprisonment in Owerri

of 100 women protesting against violence carried out by the security forces and specifically the attack on my home; in 2017 and 2018 brutal beatings given by Nigerian soldiers and police to anyone wearing or carrying the Biafran flag, including a disabled man in Onitsha; the indiscriminate burning down of houses by Nigerian Police in Abia State in October 2019, because their inhabitants support Biafran self-determination.

The Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB) that I lead, has one principal purpose: we call for the recognition of the Biafran people's right to self-determination. We pursue the right to self-determination for Biafrans without the use of force. We uphold human rights. We reject violence. Our successes are measured by peaceful protest, such as the stay-at-home day we have organised on 30 May each year to commemorate the Biafran declaration of independence in 1967.



Amarachi Onyemaechi lost a leg during a pro-Biafra protest in 2015 (AFP/Getty)

And yet, despite the violence meted out to us on such occasions, we are called 'terrorists' and proscribed by the Nigerian government. No one else in the world has agreed with this move to ban our movement.

In a letter to the president of Nigeria in March 2019, the African Commission on [Human and Peoples' Rights declared](#) Nigeria's proscription of IPOB as a terrorist group and attacks against its members as prima facie

violation of the African Charter on Human and People's Rights. The outlawing of IPOB has given the Nigerian government an excuse to send in the army and provided impetus for Islamist militias to drive us from our homes.

Biafra has always been wealthier, better endowed with natural resources and more creative with them than the north of Nigeria. When Nigeria was created in 1914 the stated purpose by then Governor of Britain's West African colonies, Sir Frederick Lugard, was to marry the rich South to the Poor North and even up the economics of both. It never worked. It only forced together unhappy and angry bedfellows.

The outlawing of IPOB has given the Nigerian government an excuse to send in the army and provided impetus for Islamist militias to drive us from our homes

Almost from the moment Nigeria's independence was declared, the Biafran people wanted out, which led to the bloody war of 1967-70. Now Nigeria's government, dominated for so many years by politicians and top brass from the north, has set itself to oppose with full military force peaceful calls for Biafran self-determination. No doubt they hope to stave off the collapse of Nigeria, which [commentators from all regions](#) have recognised in recent months.

I came back to my home country in October 2015 to try to help bring an end to the violence and persecution by peaceful means. From London, where I had been living, I had set up Radio Biafra to offer a platform for debate over the right to self-determination of the Biafran people. Because of my activism and vocal criticism of the Nigerian government, I was arrested, demeaned, degraded and treated atrociously and held without trial in an undisclosed location for 18 months.

I was accused of treason and belonging to an illegal organisation. I was denied the bail that had been granted me. And when I was finally released

on bail, less than a month before my court hearing, the Nigerian army was sent to kill me as part of its ongoing activities against Biafrans known as Operation Python Dance. So I wouldn't have a judge decide on my case in a free and open hearing. I wouldn't be able to expose the attempts by the Department of State Security to silence me. I wouldn't have the chance to turn the spotlight of the media on to Nigeria itself.



A security guard in the empty Ogbaru Market in 2017, closed to commemorate the 50th anniversary of the Nigerian Civil War (AFP/Getty)

After that terrible day in September 2017, I woke up in a safe house. I was in great pain. My left side was swollen, and every breath was agonising. I had internal bleeding, a doctor told me, and I was advised to rest before I could go anywhere. Then I remembered my parents, my family members who had stayed in the house, young nephews and nieces. I was told they had all congregated in my mother's room when the soldiers broke in. The

room was peppered with machine gun fire.



Nnamdi Kanu (centre) with his parents

At the time I knew nothing more. Later on I discovered how, miraculously, no one was killed or badly hurt and the Nigerian army let them be once they knew I was not in the house. But the attack took its toll on my parents. My mother suffered heart complications as a result of the trauma and stress of the Nigerian army's invasion of my house. She became very ill and died earlier this year. It would not be an overstatement to say that the primary cause of my mother's death was Operation Python Dance 2. I have lost a mother. My father, a strong man, a chief among Biafrans, has lost his life's companion. Sadly, we have watched his own health decline since the attack on our home and my mother's death.

I mourn my mother. I mourn all my IPOB family member who had given their lives to protect mine. All those who have been killed since, protesting

the actions of the Nigerian security forces in Biafraland. They were brave, good people. They should not have been forced to make that sacrifice, but I will honour them for it until my dying day.

All those who have been killed, protesting the actions of the Nigerian security forces in Biafraland, were brave, good people. They should not have been forced to make that sacrifice

Eventually we were able to rent a boat on the coast. We left from a small town in Abia, Azumiri, an unobtrusive place where the Nigerian authorities might not have thought to look. We planned to go to the Republic of Benin, just west of Nigeria. For 14 days we travelled in dangerous seas in a small boat with an outboard motor. The Atlantic off that coast is heavy, stormy, treacherous. On more than one occasion waves threatened to swamp our little craft. I was still gravely injured and in need of constant medical attention. At one point we put ashore to find ice to keep the medication I needed chilled. It was a dangerous time. I stayed hidden in a room while my companions went foraging for supplies.

From Benin I travelled by road to Senegal, a distance of nearly 2,000 kilometres. Once in Senegal I was able to make arrangements to travel to Israel. None of these journeys was easy. I was still in pain and the threat from Nigerian agents abroad never went away. When we stopped to rest on the road, I couldn't go out. My world was shrunk to a room with a window, and sometimes not even that. I might as well have been in prison.

Benin, Togo, Ghana, Ivory Coast, all the countries I had to pass through rely economically on Nigeria, their governments corrupt enough to arrest me and send me back. I had to stay silent, unknown. I couldn't even tell my wife or family where I was, just in case they became targets. It was agonising to realise that they didn't know if I was dead or alive. Israel was a haven for

me, but it took over a year to get there, and only then did I feel confident enough to let my fellow IPOB family members and immediate family know I was safe.



A convoy of Nigerian soldiers in Aba, a pro-Biafra separatist zone (AFP/Getty)

The men who came to my family home in September 2017, came to kill me. I have no doubt of this. If they wanted to arrest me or question me, they would have sent the police or agents of the DSS. Why send soldiers trained to kill, if not to kill? I had wanted my day in court in 2017, but the military response tells me that the rule of law in Nigeria has collapsed. Government agents act with impunity, and I include among them the Fulani terrorists who are doing the Nigerian government's dirty work, not one of whom has been brought to justice for the murders they've carried out.

It is a sign that Nigeria itself is imploding. The old order which has clung to

power for decades can only survive at the end of a gun. But even now, if a Nigerian government was willing to talk honestly and openly about our demands and to consider a referendum on self-determination for the Biafran people, in a neutral space provided by the United Nations, I would be there at the table.

Look around Africa today. There are some countries with a functioning democracy, where the rule of law is respected, and free and fair elections allowed. But not Nigeria. Our struggle for self-determination is the struggle of Africa's post-colonisation from Algeria to the Cape. If we can achieve this, perhaps we can lead other African countries to bring democracy and respect for law and human rights into the lives of African peoples.

DISSEMINATED BY MERCURY PUBLIC AFFAIRS, LLC, A REGISTERED FOREIGN AGENT, ON BEHALF OF [NAME OF FOREIGN PRINCIPAL]. MORE INFORMATION IS ON FILE WITH THE DEPT. OF JUSTICE, WASHINGTON, DC".

HR 4644 Recommended Changes

Page 4 line 12 Add

(7) The GNA is the recognized government of Libya and was working with UNSMIL to support democracy and elections

Page 4 line 21 Add

Against the recognized government of Libya

Page 4 line 22 Add a new (9)

(9) We recognize the right of the GNA to defend itself;

Background: A key point is that Haftar created the environment by bombing Tripoli at the start of the election planning. Haftar increased the scope of the conflict by receiving support from proxy players- the GNA is defending itself and has the “exclusive right” under the Libyan Political Agreement on Dec 17, 2015, to “contract for and authorize the importation of arms and ammunition into Libya”

Page 5, line 3, Section 10

Remove “both” and then “the GNA” so the line reads:

(10) The LNA movement and their associated forces have failed to observe their obligations under international humanitarian law, increased the geographic scope of the conflict, ignored calls for de-escalation and a ceasefire, etc...

Page 5 line 19

Remove ‘warring parties’ and insert “the LNA”

Disseminated by Mercury Public Affairs, LLC, a registered foreign agent, on behalf of the Government of National Accord Libya, Office of the Prime Minister. More information is on file with the Department of Justice, Washington, DC.

Page 7 line 23

(6) remove "the parties" and add "the LNA" to immediately de-escalate...

Page 8 line 11 Add a new (9)

(9) recognize the strides taken by the Central Bank of Libya to create and fair and transparent allocation of resources.

- (a) They have improved Libya's balance of payments
- (b) Moved Libya from deficit spending to a surplus
- (c) Successfully manages the oil sales payments
- (d) Ensure continuous payments of public salaries for all Libyans

Page 8 line 14

Remove "a fair and transparent allocation of resources"

DAV19I99

S.L.C.

116TH CONGRESS
1ST SESSION

S. 2934

To clarify United States policy toward Libya, advance a diplomatic solution to the conflict in Libya, and support the people of Libya.

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

Mr. COONS (for himself, Mr. GRAHAM, Mr. MURPHY, and Mr. RUBIO) introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred to the Committee on _____

A BILL

To clarify United States policy toward Libya, advance a diplomatic solution to the conflict in Libya, and support the people of Libya.

1 *Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-*
2 *tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,*

3 **SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.**

4 (a) **SHORT TITLE.**—This Act may be cited as the
5 “Libya Stabilization Act”.

6 (b) **TABLE OF CONTENTS.**—The table of contents for
7 this Act is as follows:

Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.

Sec. 2. Findings; statement of policy.

TITLE I—IDENTIFYING CHALLENGES TO STABILITY IN LIBYA

2

Sec. 101. Codification of Executive Order 13726.

Sec. 102. Report on activities of certain foreign governments and actors in Libya.

Sec. 103. Strategy to counter Russian influence in Libya.

TITLE II—ACTIONS TO ADDRESS FOREIGN INTERVENTION IN
LIBYA

Sec. 201. Definitions.

Sec. 202. Imposition of sanctions with respect to persons supporting Russian military intervention in Libya.

Sec. 203. Imposition of sanctions with respect to persons threatening the peace or stability of Libya.

Sec. 204. Imposition of sanctions with respect to certain persons who are responsible for or complicit in human rights abuses committed in Libya.

Sec. 205. Sanctions described.

Sec. 206. Waiver; exceptions.

Sec. 207. Implementation; regulations; penalties.

Sec. 208. Termination.

TITLE III—ASSISTANCE FOR LIBYA

Sec. 301. Humanitarian relief for the people of Libya and international refugees and migrants in Libya.

Sec. 302. Support for democratic governance, elections, and democratic civil society.

Sec. 303. Engaging international financial institutions to advance Libyan economic recovery and improve public sector financial management.

Sec. 304. Recovering assets stolen from the Libyan people.

Sec. 305. Special envoy for Libya.

1 **SEC. 2. FINDINGS; STATEMENT OF POLICY.**

2 (a) **FINDINGS.**—Congress makes the following find-
3 ings:

4 (1) The stability and territorial unity of Libya
5 is critical to the security of the United States, Eu-
6 rope, North Africa, and the Sahel, as well as mari-
7 time routes in the southern Mediterranean Sea.

8 (2) General Thomas Waldhauser, former Com-
9 mander of United States Africa Command
10 (AFRICOM), told the Committee on Armed Services
11 of the Senate in March 2017, that “instability in

DAV19199

S.L.C.

3

1 Libya and North Africa may be the most significant,
2 near-term threat to U.S. and allies' interests on the
3 continent".

4 (3) AFRICOM identifies containing instability
5 in Libya as one of its six main lines of effort in Afri-
6 ca and works to support diplomatic efforts to recon-
7 stitute the Libyan state and to disrupt terrorist or-
8 ganizations that impede that process or threaten
9 United States interests.

10 (4) According to the Director of National Intel-
11 ligence, as of 2019, the capabilities of the Libya-
12 based Islamic State (ISIS) affiliate "have been de-
13 graded, but it is still capable of conducting attacks
14 on local and Western targets in Libya and possibly
15 elsewhere in the region". According to United Na-
16 tions Special Representative of the Secretary Gen-
17 eral (SRSG) Ghassan Salamé, ISIS has conducted
18 several attacks since April 4, 2019.

19 (5) On September 22, 2016, a Joint Commu-
20 nique on Libya, signed by Egypt, Italy, Qatar, Rus-
21 sia, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, the United Arab Emir-
22 ates, and others, reaffirmed a joint "commitment to
23 the United Nations Support Mission in Libya's
24 [UNSMIL] efforts under the leadership of the UN
25 Special Representative of the Secretary General".

1 (6) On March 1, 2019, the United States Gov-
2 ernment, along with the Governments of France,
3 Italy, and the United Kingdom, reiterated its strong
4 support to the diplomatic efforts of SRSO Ghassan
5 Salamé and UNSMIL, rejected a military solution in
6 Libya, and called on all Libyans to work construc-
7 tively with SRSO Salamé to realize a stable and uni-
8 fied government that can deliver security and pros-
9 perity for all Libyans.

10 (7) UNSMIL planned to host a long-awaited
11 National Conference in Ghadames, Libya to begin
12 on April 14, 2019, to help the people of Libya nego-
13 tiate a path toward interim governance structures
14 and credible and secure elections.

15 (8) On April 4, 2019, Khalifa Haftar, the com-
16 mander of the Libyan National Army (LNA) move-
17 ment ordered forces loyal to him to begin a unilat-
18 eral military operation to take control of Tripoli, the
19 capital of Libya, while United Nations Secretary-
20 General Antonio Guterres was visiting Tripoli to
21 promote the National Conference.

22 (9) Tripoli is the seat of the Government of Na-
23 tional Accord (GNA), an interim body that emerged
24 from previous United Nations-backed negotiations
25 and that the United States Government and the

DAV19I99

S.L.C.

5

1 United Nations Security Council have recognized
2 since 2015.

3 (10) Although the LNA movement initiated the
4 offensive, all parties to the conflict and their associ-
5 ated forces have since April 2019 failed to observe
6 their obligations under international humanitarian
7 law and increased the geographic scope of the con-
8 flict, including by using heavy weapons, aircraft, and
9 armed drones provided by foreign powers in violation
10 of the United Nations arms embargo. Foreign mer-
11 cenaries have reportedly also participated in the con-
12 flict.

13 (11) Without the full cooperation of all United
14 Nations member states in implementing the arms
15 embargo in accordance with United Nations Security
16 Council Resolution 2473 (2019), and all relevant
17 predecessor resolutions, the flow of weapons to
18 Libya will continue to fuel the conflict.

19 (12) According to SRSG Salamé, weapons pro-
20 vided by foreign powers to the warring parties are
21 being sold to or captured by terrorist groups active
22 in Libya.

23 (13) According to the United Nations, since the
24 LNA movement offensive began in April 2019, the
25 conflict in Libya has led to the deaths of more than

1 1,100 people, including more than 100 civilians, and
2 the displacement of more than 120,000 people.

3 (14) Parties to the conflict in Libya have requi-
4 sitioned the houses of civilians, targeted medical fa-
5 cilities, and inhibited humanitarian access to food,
6 health, and other life-saving services, worsening hu-
7 manitarian conditions.

8 (15) More than 5,100 refugees and migrants
9 are detained in detention facilities in Libya, includ-
10 ing more than 3,000 in and around the conflict
11 zones in Tripoli, with serious risks of torture, star-
12 vation, sexual abuse, and death. On July 2, 2019, an
13 airstrike against the Tajura Detention Center killed
14 53 and wounded 130 people trapped in the center.
15 The United Nations has called for the immediate re-
16 lease, evacuation, and protection of refugees and mi-
17 grants detained in conflict zones.

18 (b) STATEMENT OF POLICY.—It is the policy of the
19 United States—

20 (1) to engage regularly at the senior-most levels
21 and assert there is no military solution to the con-
22 flict in Libya and that only a political process can
23 secure United States interests, ensure a stable and
24 unified Libya, reduce the threat of terrorism, and

DAV19I99

S.L.C.

7

1 provide peace and opportunity to the people of
2 Libya;

3 (2) to support the implementation of United
4 Nations Security Council Resolutions 1970 (2011)
5 and 1973 (2011), which established an arms embar-
6 go on Libya, and subsequent resolutions modifying
7 and extending the embargo;

8 (3) to support the implementation of United
9 Nations Security Council Resolutions 2146 (2014)
10 and 2362 (2017), which condemn attempts to illic-
11 itly export petroleum and refined petroleum products
12 from Libya, including by parallel institutions which
13 are not acting under the authority of the Govern-
14 ment of National Accord;

15 (4) to promote unified and effective Libyan
16 oversight over the Libyan National Oil Corporation,
17 the Central Bank of Libya, and the Libyan Invest-
18 ment Authority;

19 (5) to enforce Executive Order 13726 (81 Fed.
20 Reg. 23559; relating to blocking property and sus-
21 pending entry into the United States of persons con-
22 tributing to the situation in Libya (April 19, 2016)),
23 designed to target individuals or entities who
24 “threaten the peace, security, and stability of
25 Libya”;

1 (6) to employ sanctions and support war-crimes
2 prosecution, against any and all parties engaging in
3 attacks on civilians, medical workers, and critical in-
4 frastructure, including water supplies, in Libya;

5 (7) to contribute to the peace and stability of
6 Libya, prevent destabilizing arms shipments, and
7 support efforts to safeguard Libya's oil resources in
8 accordance with United Nations Security Council
9 Resolutions 2259 (2015), 2278 (2016), 2362
10 (2017), and 2473 (2019);

11 (8) to leverage diplomatic relations to convince
12 the parties to the conflict in Libya to immediately
13 de-escalate and halt their current fighting and per-
14 suade foreign powers to stop providing weapons and
15 financing that exacerbate the conflict;

16 (9) to encourage the parties to promptly return
17 to a political process led by the SRSQ and head of
18 UNSMIL;

19 (10) to support the United Nations-mediated
20 political process, which seeks a negotiated and
21 peaceful solution to the Libyan crisis;

22 (11) that a negotiated and peaceful political so-
23 lution should include a transitional, civilian-led gov-
24 ernment representing all Libyans, preparations for
25 credible elections, a fair and transparent allocation

DAV19199

S.L.C.

9

1 of resources, interim security arrangements, and a
2 process to reunify security and economic institu-
3 tions;

4 (12) to support constant, unimpeded, and reli-
5 able humanitarian access to those in need and to
6 hold accountable those who impede or threaten the
7 delivery of humanitarian assistance;

8 (13) to advocate for the immediate release and
9 safe evacuations of detained refugees and migrants
10 trapped by the fighting in Libya;

11 (14) to assist implementation of UNSMIL's
12 plan for the organized and gradual closure of mi-
13 grant detention centers in Libya and ensure robust
14 protection assistance for refugees and migrants; and

15 (15) to support future democratic development
16 and the economic recovery of Libya both during and
17 after a negotiated and peaceful political solution.

18 **TITLE I—IDENTIFYING CHAL-**
19 **LENGES TO STABILITY IN**
20 **LIBYA**

21 **SEC. 101. CODIFICATION OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 13726.**

22 Notwithstanding any other provision of law or Execu-
23 tive order, Executive Order 13726 (81 Fed. Reg. 23559),
24 signed on April 19, 2016, and entitled “Blocking Property
25 and Suspending Entry into the United States of Persons

1 Contributing to the Situation in Libya” shall have the
2 force and effect of law.

3 **SEC. 102. REPORT ON ACTIVITIES OF CERTAIN FOREIGN**
4 **GOVERNMENTS AND ACTORS IN LIBYA.**

5 (a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 90 days after the
6 date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State,
7 in coordination with the Director of National Intelligence,
8 shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees
9 a report that includes—

10 (1) a description of the full extent of involve-
11 ment in Libya by the Governments of Saudi Arabia,
12 Egypt, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Turkey,
13 Sudan, Russia, the People’s Republic of China,
14 France, and Italy, including—

15 (A) a description of which governments are
16 linked to drone and aircraft strikes;

17 (B) the estimated dollar value and the
18 amounts of various types of equipment trans-
19 ferred to the warring parties; and

20 (C) an attribution of outside financial sup-
21 port provided to each reported presence of for-
22 eign forces and mercenaries in Libya;

23 (2) a determination and analysis of whether the
24 actions by the governments identified in paragraph
25 (1)—

DAV19I99

S.L.C.

11

1 (A) violate the arms embargo with respect
2 to Libya in accordance with United Nations Se-
3 curity Council Resolution 2473 (2019) and
4 predecessor Security Council resolutions; or

5 (B) contribute to civilian death, harm, or
6 other violations of international humanitarian
7 law;

8 (3) a list of the specific offending materiel or fi-
9 nancial support transfers that would be in violation
10 of the arms embargo with respect to Libya in ac-
11 cordance with United Nations Security Council Res-
12 olution 2473 (2019) and predecessor Security Coun-
13 cil resolutions;

14 (4) a determination and analysis of the activi-
15 ties of foreign armed groups, including affiliates of
16 the Islamic State (ISIS), al-Qaida in the Islamic
17 Maghreb (AQIM), and Ansar al-Sharia, in Libya;
18 and

19 (5) a determination of whether and to what ex-
20 tent the conflict in Libya is enabling the recruitment
21 and training efforts of armed groups, including af-
22 filiates of ISIS, AQIM, and Ansar al-Sharia.

23 (b) FORM.—The report required by subsection (a)
24 shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may contain
25 a classified annex.

1 (c) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES DE-
2 FINED.—In this section, the term “appropriate congres-
3 sional committees” means—

4 (1) the Committee on Armed Services, the
5 Committee on Foreign Relations, and the Select
6 Committee on Intelligence of the Senate; and

7 (2) the Committee on Armed Services, the
8 Committee on Foreign Affairs, and the Permanent
9 Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of
10 Representatives.

11 **SEC. 103. STRATEGY TO COUNTER RUSSIAN INFLUENCE IN**
12 **LIBYA.**

13 (a) FINDINGS.—Congress makes the following find-
14 ings:

15 (1) In the 2019 “posture statement” to Con-
16 gress provided by General Thomas Waldhauser,
17 Commander of United States Africa Command
18 (AFRICOM), asserted that Russia was “invok[ing]
19 Qaddafi-era relationships and debts to obtain eco-
20 nomic and military contracts . . . aimed at access-
21 ing Libya’s vast oil market, reviving arms sales, and
22 gaining access to coastal territories”.

23 (2) Russia’s involvement in Libya and neigh-
24 boring countries is part of a larger regional strategy
25 to monitor the southern coastline of the North At-

DAV19199

S.L.C.

13

1 lantic Treaty Organization (NATO), isolate Europe
2 from Africa, and exert control over the southern
3 Mediterranean Sea region.

4 (b) REPORT AND STRATEGY.—

5 (1) REPORT.—Not later than 90 days after the
6 date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of
7 State and the Secretary of Defense shall submit to
8 the appropriate congressional committees a report
9 on—

10 (A) an assessment of Russian influence
11 and objectives in Libya;

12 (B) the potential threat such influence
13 poses to the United States, southern Europe,
14 and NATO operations in the Mediterranean
15 Sea;

16 (C) Russia's use of currency issuing and
17 printing; and

18 (D) Russia's use of mercenaries, military
19 contractors, and paramilitary forces in Libya.

20 (2) STRATEGY.—Not later than 30 days after
21 the date on which the report required by paragraph
22 (1) is submitted to the appropriate congressional
23 committees, the Secretary of State and the Secretary
24 of Defense shall brief the appropriate congressional

1 committees regarding a strategy to counter threats
2 identified in the report.

3 (3) FORM.—The report required by paragraph
4 (1) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may
5 contain a classified annex.

6 (4) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMIT-
7 TEES DEFINED.—In this subsection, the term “ap-
8 propriate congressional committees” means—

9 (A) the Committee on Armed Services, the
10 Committee on Foreign Relations, the Select
11 Committee on Intelligence, and the Committee
12 on Appropriations of the Senate; and

13 (B) the Committee on Armed Services, the
14 Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Permanent
15 Select Committee on Intelligence, and the Com-
16 mittee on Appropriations of the House of Rep-
17 resentatives.

18 **TITLE II—ACTIONS TO ADDRESS**
19 **FOREIGN INTERVENTION IN**
20 **LIBYA**

21 **SEC. 201. DEFINITIONS.**

22 In this title:

23 (1) ADMISSION; ADMITTED, ALIEN.—The terms
24 “admission”, “admitted”, and “alien” have the

DAV19199

S.L.C.

15

1 meanings given those terms in section 101 of the
2 Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101).

3 (2) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMIT-
4 TEES.—The term “appropriate congressional com-
5 mittees” means—

6 (A) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and
7 the Committee on Financial Services of the
8 House of Representatives; and

9 (B) the Committee on Foreign Relations
10 and the Committee on Banking, Housing, and
11 Urban Affairs of the Senate.

12 (3) FOREIGN PERSON.—The term “foreign per-
13 son” means an individual or entity that is not a
14 United States person.

15 (4) KNOWINGLY.—The term “knowingly” with
16 respect to conduct, a circumstance, or a result,
17 means that a person has actual knowledge, or should
18 have known, of the conduct, the circumstance, or the
19 result.

20 (5) UNITED STATES PERSON.—The term
21 “United States person” means—

22 (A) a United States citizen or an alien law-
23 fully admitted for permanent residence to the
24 United States; or

1 (B) an entity organized under the laws of
2 the United States or any jurisdiction within the
3 United States, including a foreign branch of
4 such an entity.

5 **SEC. 202. IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO**
6 **PERSONS SUPPORTING RUSSIAN MILITARY**
7 **INTERVENTION IN LIBYA.**

8 (a) IN GENERAL.—On and after the date that is 180
9 days after the date on which the report required by section
10 102 is submitted to the appropriate congressional commit-
11 tees, the President shall impose the sanctions described
12 in section 205 with respect to a foreign person if the Presi-
13 dent determines that the foreign person, on or after the
14 date of the enactment of this Act, knowingly engages in
15 an activity described in subsection (b).

16 (b) ACTIVITIES DESCRIBED.—A foreign person en-
17 gages in an activity described in this subsection if the per-
18 son knowingly provides significant financial, material, or
19 technological support to, or knowingly engages in a signifi-
20 cant transaction with—

21 (1) a foreign person that is knowingly operating
22 in a military capacity in Libya for or on behalf of
23 the Government of the Russian Federation; or

24 (2) a foreign person that is a military con-
25 tractor, mercenary, or a paramilitary force know-

DAV19I99

S.L.C.

17

1 ingly operating in a military capacity in Libya for or
2 on behalf of the Government of the Russian Federa-
3 tion.

4 **SEC. 203. IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO**
5 **PERSONS THREATENING THE PEACE OR STA-**
6 **BILITY OF LIBYA.**

7 (a) IN GENERAL.—On and after the date that is 180
8 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Presi-
9 dent shall impose the sanctions described in section 205
10 with respect to a foreign person if the President deter-
11 mines that the person, on or after the date of the enact-
12 ment of this Act, knowingly engages in an activity de-
13 scribed in subsection (b).

14 (b) ACTIVITIES DESCRIBED.—A foreign person en-
15 gages in an activity described in this subsection if the per-
16 son knowingly—

17 (1) is engaged in significant actions or policies
18 that threaten the peace, security, or stability of
19 Libya, including through the supply of arms or re-
20 lated materiel;

21 (2) is engaged in significant actions or policies
22 that obstruct, undermine, delay, or impede, or pose
23 a significant risk of obstructing, undermining, delay-
24 ing, or impeding the United Nations-mediated polit-

1 ical process that seeks a negotiated and peaceful so-
2 lution to the Libyan crisis;

3 (3) is engaged in significant actions or policies
4 that may lead to or result in the misappropriation
5 of significant assets of the Government of Libya;

6 (4) is involved in, or has been involved in, the
7 significant illicit exploitation of crude oil or any
8 other natural resources in Libya, including the sig-
9 nificant illicit production, refining, brokering, sale,
10 purchase, or export of oil produced in Libya;

11 (5) is significantly threatening or coercing fi-
12 nancial institutions owned or controlled by the Gov-
13 ernment of Libya or the Libyan National Oil Com-
14 pany;

15 (6) is significantly responsible for actions or
16 policies that are intended to undermine—

17 (A) the United Nations-led political proc-
18 ess to end the conflict in Libya; or

19 (B) efforts to promote stabilization and
20 economic recovery in Libya;

21 (7) is significantly responsible for civilian cas-
22 ualties or violations of international humanitarian
23 law;

24 (8) is a successor entity to a person referred to
25 in any of paragraphs (1) through (7);

DAV19I99

S.L.C.

19

1 (9) owns or controls, or is owned or controlled
2 by, a person referred to in any of paragraphs (1)
3 through (7);

4 (10) is acting for or on behalf of a person re-
5 ferred to in any of paragraphs (1) through (7); or

6 (11) has provided, or attempted to provide, sig-
7 nificant financial, material, technological, or other
8 support for, or goods or services in support of, a
9 person referred to in any of paragraphs (1) through
10 (7).

11 **SEC. 204. IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO**
12 **CERTAIN PERSONS WHO ARE RESPONSIBLE**
13 **FOR OR COMPLICIT IN HUMAN RIGHTS**
14 **ABUSES COMMITTED IN LIBYA.**

15 (a) IN GENERAL.—The President shall impose the
16 sanctions described in section 205 with respect to each for-
17 eign person on the list required by subsection (b).

18 (b) LIST OF PERSONS.—

19 (1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days
20 after the date of the enactment of this Act, the
21 President shall submit to the appropriate congres-
22 sional committees a list of foreign persons that the
23 President determines are knowingly responsible for
24 or complicit in, or to have directly or indirectly en-
25 gaged in, serious human rights abuses and violations

1 of international humanitarian law committed in
2 Libya.

3 (2) UPDATES OF LIST.—The President shall
4 submit to the appropriate congressional committees
5 an updated list under paragraph (1)—

6 (A) not later than 180 days after the date
7 of the enactment of this Act and annually
8 thereafter until the date that is 5 years after
9 such date of enactment; or

10 (B) as new information becomes available.

11 (3) FORM.—The list required by paragraph (1)
12 shall be submitted in unclassified form but may in-
13 clude a classified annex.

14 **SEC. 205. SANCTIONS DESCRIBED.**

15 The sanctions to be imposed with respect to a foreign
16 person under section 202, 203, or 204 are the following:

17 (1) BLOCKING OF PROPERTY.—The President
18 shall exercise all of the powers granted to the Presi-
19 dent by the International Emergency Economic
20 Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.) (except that
21 the requirements of section 202 of such Act (50
22 U.S.C. 1701) shall not apply) to the extent nec-
23 essary to block and prohibit all transactions in prop-
24 erty and interests in property of the person if such
25 property and interests in property are in the United

DAV19199

S.L.C.

21

1 States, come within the United States, or are or
2 come within the possession or control of a United
3 States person.

4 (2) INADMISSIBILITY OF CERTAIN INDIVID-
5 UALS.—

6 (A) INELIGIBILITY FOR VISAS, ADMISSION,
7 OR PAROLE.—An alien described in section 202,
8 203, or 204(b)(1) is—

9 (i) inadmissible to the United States;
10 (ii) ineligible to receive a visa or other
11 documentation to enter the United States;
12 and

13 (iii) otherwise ineligible to be admitted
14 or paroled into the United States or to re-
15 ceive any other benefit under the Immigra-
16 tion and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101 et
17 seq.).

18 (B) CURRENT VISAS REVOKED.—

19 (i) IN GENERAL.—An alien described
20 in section 202, 203, or 204(b)(1) is subject
21 to revocation of any visa or other entry
22 documentation regardless of when the visa
23 or other entry documentation is or was
24 issued.

1 (ii) IMMEDIATE EFFECT.—A revoca-
2 tion under clause (i) shall—

3 (I) take effect immediately; and

4 (II) automatically cancel any
5 other valid visa or entry documenta-
6 tion that is in the alien's possession.

7 **SEC. 206. WAIVER; EXCEPTIONS.**

8 (a) WAIVER.—The President, acting through the Sec-
9 retary of State, may waive the application of sanctions im-
10 posed with respect to a foreign person under this title if
11 the Secretary—

12 (1) determines that such a waiver is in the na-
13 tional interest of the United States; and

14 (2) not later than the date on which the waiver
15 takes effect, submits to the appropriate congres-
16 sional committees a notice of and justification for
17 the waiver.

18 (b) EXCEPTION FOR COMPLIANCE WITH INTER-
19 NATIONAL OBLIGATIONS.—Section 205(2) shall not apply
20 to an alien if admitting or paroling the alien into the
21 United States is necessary to permit the United States
22 to comply with the Agreement regarding the Headquarters
23 of the United Nations, signed at Lake Success June 26,
24 1947, and entered into force November 21, 1947, between

DAV19199

S.L.C.

23

1 the United Nations and the United States, or other appli-
2 cable international obligations of the United States.

3 (c) EXCEPTION RELATING TO IMPORTATION OF
4 GOODS.—

5 (1) IN GENERAL.—The authorities and require-
6 ments to impose sanctions under this title shall not
7 include the authority or requirement to impose sanc-
8 tions on the importation of goods.

9 (2) GOOD DEFINED.—In this subsection, the
10 term “good” means any article, natural or man-
11 made substance, material, supply or manufactured
12 product, including inspection and test equipment
13 and excluding technical data.

14 **SEC. 207. IMPLEMENTATION; REGULATIONS; PENALTIES.**

15 (a) IMPLEMENTATION.—The President may exercise
16 all authorities provided to the President under sections
17 203 and 205 of the International Emergency Economic
18 Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1702 and 1704) to carry out this
19 title.

20 (b) REGULATIONS.—The President shall issue such
21 regulations, licenses, and orders as are necessary to carry
22 out this title.

23 (c) PENALTIES.—A person that violates, attempts to
24 violate, conspires to violate, or causes a violation of this
25 title or any regulation, license, or order issued to carry

1 out this title shall be subject to the penalties set forth in
2 subsections (b) and (c) of section 206 of the International
3 Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1705) to the
4 same extent as a person that commits an unlawful act de-
5 scribed in subsection (a) of that section.

6 **SEC. 208. TERMINATION.**

7 The requirement to impose sanctions under this title
8 shall terminate on December 31, 2024.

9 **TITLE III—ASSISTANCE FOR**
10 **LIBYA**

11 **SEC. 301. HUMANITARIAN RELIEF FOR THE PEOPLE OF**
12 **LIBYA AND INTERNATIONAL REFUGEES AND**
13 **MIGRANTS IN LIBYA.**

14 (a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-
15 gress that—

16 (1) the United States Government should—

17 (A) expand efforts to address Libya's hu-
18 manitarian crisis;

19 (B) leverage diplomatic relations with the
20 warring parties to guarantee constant, reliable
21 humanitarian access by frontline providers in
22 Libya;

23 (C) leverage diplomatic relations with the
24 warring parties, the United Nations, and the
25 European Union to ensure the release of vul-

DAV19I99

S.L.C.

25

1 nerable migrants and refugees from detention
2 centers and their voluntary safe passage from
3 the conflict zones in Libya; and

4 (D) expand efforts to document and pub-
5 licize violations of human rights and inter-
6 national humanitarian law and hold perpetra-
7 tors accountable; and

8 (2) humanitarian assistance to address the cri-
9 sis in Libya should be targeted toward those most
10 in need and delivered through partners that uphold
11 internationally recognized humanitarian principles.

12 (b) ASSISTANCE AUTHORIZED.—

13 (1) IN GENERAL.—The Administrator of the
14 United States Agency for International Develop-
15 ment, in coordination with the Secretary of State, is
16 authorized to provide humanitarian assistance to in-
17 dividuals and communities in Libya.

18 (2) INCLUDED ASSISTANCE.—Assistance au-
19 thorized by paragraph (1) shall include the following
20 to affected communities, including refugee and mi-
21 grant populations:

22 (A) Urgently needed health assistance, in-
23 cluding logistical and technical assistance to
24 hospitals, ambulances, and health clinics.

1 (B) Public health commodities and serv-
2 ices, including medicines and basic medical sup-
3 plies and equipment.

4 (C) Protection assistance for vulnerable
5 populations, including women, children, refu-
6 gees, and migrants.

7 (D) Other assistance, including food, shel-
8 ter, water, sanitation, and hygiene (WASH), as
9 needed.

10 (E) Technical assistance to ensure health,
11 food, and commodities are appropriately se-
12 lected, procured, targeted, and distributed.

13 (c) STRATEGY.—Not later than 180 days after the
14 date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State,
15 in coordination with the Administrator of the United
16 States Agency for International Development, shall submit
17 to the appropriate congressional committees a strategy on
18 the following:

19 (1) How the United States Government, work-
20 ing with relevant foreign governments and multilat-
21 eral organizations, plans to address the humani-
22 tarian situation in Libya.

23 (2) How to leverage diplomatic and assistance
24 tools as well as strategic burden-sharing with inter-

DAV19I99

S.L.C.

27

1 national partners to improve the humanitarian situa-
2 tion in Libya.

3 (3) How to confront humanitarian access chal-
4 lenges and ensure the delivery of humanitarian aid.

5 (4) How to ensure protection for vulnerable ref-
6 ugees and migrants.

7 (5) How the United States will engage in diplo-
8 matic efforts to ensure support from international
9 donors, including foreign governments and multilat-
10 eral organizations.

11 (d) DIPLOMATIC ENGAGEMENT.—The Secretary of
12 State, in consultation with the Administrator of the
13 United States Agency for International Development, shall
14 work with relevant foreign governments and multilateral
15 organizations to coordinate a high-level donor summit and
16 carry out diplomatic engagement to advance the provision
17 of humanitarian assistance to the people of Libya and
18 international migrants and refugees in Libya and carry
19 out the strategy required under subsection (c).

20 (e) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES DE-
21 FINED.—In this section, the term “appropriate congres-
22 sional committees” means—

23 (1) the Committee on Foreign Relations and
24 the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate; and

1 (2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the
2 Committee on Appropriations of the House of Rep-
3 resentatives.

4 **SEC. 302. SUPPORT FOR DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE, ELEC-**
5 **TIONS, AND DEMOCRATIC CIVIL SOCIETY.**

6 (a) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of State, in coordi-
7 nation with the Administrator of the United States Agen-
8 cy for International Development, shall—

9 (1) work to help the people of Libya and a fu-
10 ture Libyan government unify Libyan financial and
11 governing institutions to deliver tangible results that
12 improve the lives of the Libyan people;

13 (2) work to ensure transparent, credible, and
14 inclusive future elections in Libya, including through
15 supporting electoral security and domestic and inter-
16 national election observation and by providing re-
17 lated training and technical assistance to institutions
18 with election-related responsibilities; and

19 (3) work with nongovernmental organizations—

20 (A) to strengthen democratic governance
21 and institutions, support decentralization, and
22 give the public a stronger voice in their govern-
23 ment;

24 (B) to increase public and stakeholder con-
25 fidence in Libya's electoral system;

DAV19I99

S.L.C.

29

1 (C) to defend internationally recognized
2 human rights for the people of Libya, including
3 support for efforts to document crimes against
4 humanity and violations of human rights;

5 (D) to combat corruption and improve the
6 transparency and accountability of government
7 institutions; and

8 (E) to support the efforts of state and
9 independent media outlets to broadcast, dis-
10 tribute, and share accurate and reliable news
11 and information with the people of Libya.

12 (b) STRATEGY REQUIREMENT.—

13 (1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 45 days after
14 the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary
15 of State, in coordination with the Administrator of
16 the United States Agency for International Develop-
17 ment, shall submit to the appropriate congressional
18 committees a strategy to carry out the activities de-
19 scribed in subsection (a). The strategy shall be up-
20 dated, including with benchmarks of progress made
21 to date, and resubmitted to the appropriate congres-
22 sional committees not later than 15 days after the
23 scheduling of credible presidential and parliamentary
24 elections in Libya.

1 (2) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMIT-
2 TEES DEFINED.—In this subsection, the term “ap-
3 propriate congressional committees” means—

4 (A) the Committee on Foreign Relations
5 and the Committee on Appropriations of the
6 Senate; and

7 (B) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and
8 the Committee on Appropriations of the House
9 of Representatives.

10 (c) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—

11 (1) IN GENERAL.—There is authorized to be
12 appropriated to the Secretary of State \$23,000,000
13 for each of fiscal years 2020 through 2024 to carry
14 out subsection (a).

15 (2) NOTIFICATION REQUIREMENTS.—Any ex-
16 penditure of amounts made available to carry out
17 subsection (a) shall be subject to the notification re-
18 quirements applicable to—

19 (A) expenditures from the Economic Sup-
20 port Fund under section 531(c) of the Foreign
21 Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2346(c));
22 and

23 (B) expenditures from the Development
24 Assistance Fund under section 653(a) of the

DAV19I99

S.L.C.

31

1 Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C.
2 2413(a)).

3 **SEC. 303. ENGAGING INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL INSTITU-**
4 **TIONS TO ADVANCE LIBYAN ECONOMIC RE-**
5 **COVERY AND IMPROVE PUBLIC SECTOR FI-**
6 **NANCIAL MANAGEMENT.**

7 (a) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of the Treasury, in
8 consultation with the Secretary of State and the Adminis-
9 trator of the United States Agency for International De-
10 velopment, shall instruct the United States Executive Di-
11 rector at each international financial institution to use the
12 voice, vote, and influence of the United States to support
13 a Libyan-led process to develop a framework for the eco-
14 nomic recovery of Libya and improved public sector finan-
15 cial management, complementary to United Nations-led
16 peace efforts and in support of the future establishment
17 of democratic institutions and the rule of law in Libya.

18 (b) ADDITIONAL ELEMENTS.—The framework de-
19 scribed in subsection (a) shall include the following policy
20 proposals:

21 (1) To reunify the leadership and operations of
22 Libya's key economic ministries and institutions.

23 (2) To improve the efficiency and reach of Lib-
24 yan government programs that support poverty alle-
25 viation and a social safety net.

1 (3) To assist in reconciling the public accounts
2 of national financial institutions and letters of credit
3 issued by private Libyan financial institutions.

4 (4) To restore the production and efficient
5 management of Libya's oil industry, including re-
6 building any damaged energy infrastructure.

7 (5) To promote the development of private sec-
8 tor enterprise.

9 (6) To improve the transparency and account-
10 ability of public sector employment and wage dis-
11 tribution.

12 (7) To strengthen supervision of and reform of
13 Libyan financial institutions to minimize corruption
14 and ensure resources equitably serve the people of
15 Libya.

16 (8) To eliminate exploitation of price controls
17 and market distorting subsidies in the Libyan econ-
18 omy.

19 (c) CONSULTATION.—In supporting the framework
20 described in subsection (a), the Secretary of the Treasury
21 shall instruct the United States Executive Director at each
22 international financial institution to encourage the institu-
23 tion to consult with relevant stakeholders in the financial,
24 governance, and energy sectors.

DAV19199

S.L.C.

33

1 (d) DEFINITION OF INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL IN-
2 STITUTION.—In this section, the term “international fi-
3 nancial institution” means the International Monetary
4 Fund, International Bank for Reconstruction and Devel-
5 opment, European Bank for Reconstruction and Develop-
6 ment, International Development Association, Inter-
7 national Finance Corporation, Multilateral Investment
8 Guarantee Agency, African Development Bank, African
9 Development Fund, Asian Development Bank, Inter-
10 American Development Bank, Bank for Economic Co-
11 operation and Development in the Middle East and North
12 Africa, and Inter-American Investment Corporation.

13 (e) TERMINATION.—The requirements of this section
14 shall cease to be effective on December 31, 2024.

15 **SEC. 304. RECOVERING ASSETS STOLEN FROM THE LIBYAN**
16 **PEOPLE.**

17 (a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-
18 gress that the Secretary of State, the Secretary of the
19 Treasury, and the Attorney General should advance a co-
20 ordinated international effort—

- 21 (1) to carry out special financial investigations
22 to identify and track assets taken from the people
23 and institutions of Libyan through theft, corruption,
24 money laundering, or other illicit means; and
25 (2) to work with foreign governments—

1 (A) to share financial investigations intel-
2 ligence, as appropriate;

3 (B) to oversee the assets identified pursu-
4 ant to paragraph (1); and

5 (C) to provide technical assistance to help
6 governments establish the necessary legal
7 framework to carry out asset forfeitures.

8 (b) **ADDITIONAL ELEMENTS.**—The coordinated inter-
9 national effort described in subsection (a) should include
10 input from—

11 (1) the Office of Terrorist Financing and Fi-
12 nancial Crimes of the Department of the Treasury;

13 (2) the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network
14 of the Department of the Treasury; and

15 (3) the Money Laundering and Asset Recovery
16 Section of the Department of Justice.

17 **SEC. 305. SPECIAL ENVOY FOR LIBYA.**

18 (a) **APPOINTMENT.**—The President, in consultation
19 with the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the
20 Administrator of the United States Agency for Inter-
21 national Development, and the Chairmen and Ranking
22 Members of the appropriate congressional committees,
23 should consider appointing a Special Envoy for Libya.

24 (b) **DUTIES.**—The Special Envoy should coordinate
25 with foreign officials from the countries listed in section

DAV19I99

S.L.C.

35

1 102(a)(1) who are working on their governments' Libya
2 policy, the European Union, the United Nations, and
3 other relevant multilateral organizations to advance a sus-
4 tainable diplomatic solution to the conflict in Libya.

5 (c) TERMINATION.—The position of Special Envoy
6 should remain filled until such time as a diplomatic solu-
7 tion to the conflict in Libya is reached.

